Understanding the Political Polarization of Judges in the United States

The political landscape of the United States judiciary has been a subject of extensive debate and analysis. A 2015 study, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Politicize the Judiciary, contributes significantly to our understanding of how the legal profession and political parties intersect in the selection of judges.

Introduction to the Study

Conducted by Adam Bonica from Stanford and Maya Sen from the Harvard Kennedy School, this study investigates the ideological positions of lawyers and judges at various levels of the legal system. By examining nearly half a million judges and lawyers, the researchers provide a comprehensive analysis of the politicization of U.S. courts. This paper delves into the key findings of this study and their implications.

Attorney vs. Judge Ideological Distribution

On average, the study reveals that attorneys tend to lean slightly left of the general U.S. population. However, this generalization masks significant variations. Female lawyers, public defenders, and law professors are more likely to be liberal-leaning, while those working in large law firms are more likely to be conservative. As time progresses after bar admission, attorneys show a trend towards increased conservatism.

The study further highlights that judges are even more politically right-leaning compared to attorneys. This shift is notably pronounced at higher levels of the judicial hierarchy. For instance, Federal Courts of Appeals and state high courts are the most conservative, deviating the most from the ideological distribution of attorneys.

Consistent Evidence of Political Polarization

Evidence of political polarization in the courts is more consistent at the federal level than at the state level. The study found that courts in 24 states showed some signs of politicization, while in 26 states, there was insufficient evidence. This inconsistency raises questions about the extent and nature of judicial politicization across different states.

Strategic Action by Conservatives

Given that there are fewer conservative attorneys, the pool of viable candidates for conservative judges is smaller. However, conservative political actors have employed strategic initiatives to address this imbalance. For example, the creation of the Federalist Society in 1982 to foster conservative legal talent among graduates of elite law schools has yielded positive results.

Moreover, the authors suggest that this strategic action may explain the increasing ideological shift between attorneys and judges at higher levels of the judicial hierarchy. This indicates that conservatives are acting to ensure their ideological views are represented in the higher courts.

Implications and Conclusion

The authors of the study caution against making blanket generalizations about judicial politicization. While strong evidence exists for politicization in federal and state high courts, many states show little to no signs of such politicization. This suggests that the strategy of funneling candidates towards higher courts may be yielding benefits for conservative political actors.

The study contributes to the ongoing debate on how ideology influences the judiciary and raises important questions about the future of judicial appointments and the impact of political incentives on court decisions.

Keywords

Political polarization, Judicial politicization, Attorney ideological distribution