Key Differences in Damage Control Procedures Between US and Japanese Aircraft Carriers in WW2

In World War II, the United States Navy (USN) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) exhibited significant differences in their damage control procedures. These differences were pivotal in determining the effectiveness of both naval forces and had profound impacts on the outcome of battles. This article examines these crucial differences, drawing insights from Drarinefel’s YouTube video, which provides a comprehensive analysis of the USN and IJN’s damage control philosophies.

Feedback Loop in Damage Control

The most notable difference between the USN and IJN was the efficiency of their feedback loops in damage control. The USN adopted a short feedback loop system, often referred to as continuous improvement. This meant that lessons learned during combat were quickly applied, leading to a steady improvement in damage control measures throughout the war. For instance, following the Battle of Midway, surviving USN crew members were fully debriefed and rotated back to training schools to pass on their experiences as instructors. In contrast, the IJN concealed their losses, forfeiting the ability to learn from events. Following the Midway disaster, surviving IJN crew members were often sequestered and reassigned to distant outposts, not allowing them to share their experiences or serve as instructors.

Improvise and Innovate

A significant difference was the level of latitude given to American sailors to initiate and improvise damage control measures. Unlike their Japanese counterparts, who were usually required to await orders, American sailors were encouraged to take action quickly and effectively. This is vividly demonstrated at the Battle of Pearl Harbor, where the USS West Virginia (BB-48) was struck by seven torpedoes in quick succession. Despite the overwhelming damage, the vessel avoided capsizing due to near-spontaneous counter-flooding efforts carried out by crew members who were not even assigned to damage control at the time of the attack.

Construction and Ventilation

American carriers, particularly the numerous Essex-class carriers constructed during the war, had tighter construction requirements, ensuring that waterproof compartments were thoroughly sealed. One of the key differences in damage control was the presence of open air hangars and better ventilation on American carriers. This open design helped to prevent the build-up of flammable fumes, which could be a significant risk in combat situations. In contrast, Japanese carriers typically had closed hangars, which increased the risk of fires and explosions.

Training and Emphasis on Damage Control

The level of training and the importance placed on damage control were another critical difference. In the USN, damage control was viewed as one of the most crucial disciplines on a carrier. Even early in the war, significant training time was allocated, and the best officers were assigned to these functions. This emphasis on damage control led to highly proficient and trained personnel. In contrast, the IJN did not attach as much value to damage control functions, leading to less emphasis on training and preparation.

Japanese damage control did improve significantly later in the war, but it was never a match for the advanced and thorough damage control measures employed by the USN. The IJN’s approach led to a significant disadvantage in terms of crew readiness and the ability to respond effectively to damage, ultimately influencing the outcome of many battles and campaigns.

In conclusion, the differences in damage control procedures between the US and Japanese carriers in World War II were multifaceted and significant. From the efficiency of feedback loops to the level of training and the specific design of carriers, these differences had a substantial impact on the effectiveness and survivability of these naval forces. Understanding these key differences provides valuable insights into the strategic and tactical discrepancies that characterized this period in naval history.